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Abstract
Firms increasingly use both mass-media advertising and targeted personal selling to successfully
promote products and brands in the marketplace. In this study, we jointly examine the e￿ect of
mass-media advertising and personal selling in the context of U.S. presidential elections, where the
former is referred to as the ￿air war￿ and the latter the ￿ground game.￿ Speci￿cally, we look at how
di￿erent types of advertising=candidate own ads vs. outside ads=and personal selling=in the form of
utilizing ￿eld o￿ces=a￿ect voter preferences. Further, we ask how these various campaign activities
a￿ect the outcome of elections through their diverse e￿ects on various types of people. We ￿nd that
personal selling has a stronger e￿ect among partisan voters, while candidate’s own advertising is
better received by non-partisans. We also ￿nd that personal selling accounted for the Democratic
victories in the 2008 and 2012 elections, and that advertising was critical only in a close election,
such as the one in 2004. Interestingly, had the Democrats received more outside advertising in 2004,
the election would have ended up in a 269-269 tie. Our ￿ndings generate insights on how to allocate
resources across and within channels.
keywords: multi-channel marketing, personal selling, advertising, political campaigns, discrete-
choice model, instrumental variables.
11 Introduction
It is no secret that multi-channel marketing has increasingly been regarded as a competitive strategy
critical to market success. Firms that understand the e￿ect of and the dynamics behind their marketing
channels are likely to deliver a better customer experience and, hence, win over their customers. Among
these channels, mass-media advertising and personal selling are usually the biggest arsenal at the ￿rm’s
disposal. Advertising has the advantage of reaching a large-scale audience, using standard and well-
scripted communication messages. Its importance goes without saying: global advertising spending was
reportedly around $128 billion in 2013. 1 Personal selling, on the other hand, happens at a micro level
and takes the form of direct customer contacts, which includes regular and ad-hoc visits, distribution
of ￿iers, and telemarketing, to name just a few. It often relies on a sales force to carry out the actual
persuasion or promotion, whether it is face-to-face or over the phone. Similar to advertising, its presence
is of great importance to many businesses. In the United States alone, total spending on the sales force
has been reported to be more than four times the total spending on advertising (Zoltners et al. 2006),
and approximately 11% of the nation’s labor force is directly involved in sales or sales-related activities. 2
As advertising and personal selling are foremost in the minds of marketers, it is critical to ask the relative
e￿ectiveness of each channel and the possible synergies between them.
In this study, we examine mass-media advertising and personal selling in the context of U.S. presiden-
tial elections. Recent elections have witnessed a rapid growth in campaign spending. In the 2012 election
alone, the Democratic and Republican candidates combined spent close to $2 billion, making it one of the
most expensive elections in history. 3 Candidates have not only advertised more on the airwaves, but have
also increased their spending on personal selling e￿orts, most notably through setting up ￿eld operations
to organize voter outreach. Prompted by the tremendous increase in campaign spending, both politi-
cal strategists and the general public have engaged in a heated discussion about the e￿ect of campaign
activities on actual election outcomes. Not surprisingly, as soon as election results are revealed, credit
often goes to the winner’s campaign and its main strategist. For example, the day after the current U.S.
President, Barack H. Obama, was ￿rst elected in 2008, the New York Times’ front-page article claimed,
1Nielsen (2013).
2U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2013.
3New York Times, ￿The 2012 Money Race.￿
2￿The story of Mr. Obama’s journey to the pinnacle of American politics is the story of a campaign that
was, even in the view of many rivals, almost ￿awless.￿ 4 Also that year, fascinated by an unprecedented
￿eld campaign, the Denver Post stated that ￿Obama’s e￿ective organization (of the ￿eld teams) could
be a harbinger for how successful elections are won in battlegrounds in years to come.￿ 5 But, how much
of this is true in reality? Were campaigns and their marketing activities the determining factors leading
to Mr. Obama’s successes? If so, which mattered more; the macro-level mass-media advertising or the
micro-level personal selling?
Identifying the e￿ect of advertising and personal selling, as it turns out, is anything but trivial. Nu-
merous studies in Marketing and Economics have looked at the various e￿ects of advertising (de Kluyver
and Brodie 1987; Givon and Horsky 1990; Dekimpe and Hanssens 1995; Lodish et al. 1995; Bruce 2008),
and some in the domain of presidential elections (e.g., Gordon and Hartmann 2013). However, our un-
derstanding of personal selling is rather limited, despite the fact that it has long been regarded as an
important ingredient of the marketing mix (Borden 1964; Weitz 1981). This gap is largely due to a
paucity of high-quality empirical data and a lack of rigorous models for identifying the e￿ect of personal
selling. There are several challenges that limit a robust analysis of personal selling e￿ectiveness.
First, personal selling is often measured without su￿cient variation due to data aggregation. Narayanan
et al. (2004) studied the e￿ectiveness of personal selling in the pharmaceutical industry, and measured
personal-selling e￿orts using the total amount of detailing across the entire U.S. market. Gatignon and
Hanssens (1987) examined sales e￿ectiveness in a defense service setting but aggregated their marketing
measures to only six geographical regions. Intuitively, data on such an aggregated level can generate only
limited insights into where to allocate the sales force, an important implication for marketers aiming to
yield the best possible outcomes. The lack of reliable ￿eld data also helps explain why political scientists
primarily used experimental settings to study the e￿ect of personal selling on elections. For example,
Gerber and Green (2000) conducted a ￿eld experiment and found that personal visits increase turnout
rates. Alvarez et al. (2010), through another ￿eld experiment, found that personal selling e￿orts involving
partisan messages can have an even larger e￿ect than previously reported. However, the shortcoming
of using experimental data is that they usually are analyzed on a limited scale and, thus, can provide
4The New York Times, Nov 5, 2008.
5Sherry Allison, (2008). ￿Ground Game Licked G.O.P.￿ The Denver Post, Nov 5.
3insights for only a particular region. As empirical data have become available in recent years, several
studies have investigated personal selling e￿ectiveness on a greater scale using ￿eld data. Masket (2009)
found that a Democratic ￿eld o￿ce was associated with a disproportionate increase in its vote share in
the 2008 election; Darr and Levendusky (2014) studied the allocation of ￿eld o￿ces for the 2012 cam-
paigns and found them to raise vote shares by roughly 1%. However, both studies only looked at a single
election, con￿ning their results to a particular candidate.
Another challenge is that formal empirical models have yet been employed to su￿ciently account
for customer heterogeneity and its diverse e￿ects on various marketing-mix variables, a central focus
of many marketing applications. Understanding the diversity of consumer preference and sensitivity is
essential for designing targeted marketing plans and resource allocation strategies. Intuitively, consumers
with di￿erent characteristics would likely respond di￿erently to various marketing activities. Thus, when
making strategic decisions about allocating sales force and advertising, managers need to take into account
the e￿ect of consumer heterogeneity on the marketing-mix variables they are trying to mobilize.
Finally, and possibly most importantly, personal selling and advertising should be assessed in an
integrated manner. Including just one marketing variable may lead to biased estimates (Albers et al.
2010). Political scientists have a long history of studying the e￿ect of advertising, but few studies
have been done to understand advertising in relation to other campaign activities. In addition, results
on political advertising have been inconclusive due to measurement limitations and a lack of robust
empirical modeling (Goldstein and Ridout 2004). Many existing papers measure advertising using self-
reported rather than actual ad exposures (as explained in Shaw 1999) and often rely on survey-based
voting intention rather than on actual voting outcomes (Hillygus 2005; Huber and Arceneaux 2007). A
recent paper by Gordon and Hartmann (2013) collected empirical data on county-level voting results and
identi￿ed the causal e￿ect of political advertising. However, their paper studied advertising in isolation
from other campaign e￿orts and, as a result, could not provide guidance on how to allocate resources
across campaign channels. Further, they did not distinguish between the candidate’s own and outside
advertising, which likely would have had di￿erent e￿ects on di￿erent types of people =e.g., partisans vs.
non-partisans.
To overcome the abovementioned challenges, we study the e￿ect of personal selling and advertising in
4the three most recent U.S. presidential elections. For several reasons, presidential elections provide a good
setting for jointly studying the e￿ect of advertising and personal selling. First, as campaign activities
vary both across counties within contested states and between contested and non-contested states, our
setting provides the much-needed geographical variation in the data. The level of granularity in our data
measurement=for personal selling, in particular=is much improved from the extant applications involving
consumer package goods. Second, because the competitive landscape changes from election to election, so
do the campaigns. Thus, political elections also o￿er data variation over time. Third, political campaigns
are concentrated primarily on a short-term goal to make sales (i.e., win votes), rather than to build brand
images or maintain customer relationships. Therefore, the potential long-term e￿ect of advertising and
personal selling is less relevant in our context.
We use multiple sources to compile a rich data set that includes a total of 18,650 observations on vote
outcomes and campaign activities. For each election, we collect detailed records of ground campaigning
from both parties, down to the county level. Our data on television advertising record the number of ad
impressions supporting each candidacy at the Designated Market Area (DMA) level, and they include not
only the advertisements made by candidates and their parties, but also those made by outside political
groups. The rapid growth of outside advertisements in recent presidential elections, especially in 2012,
has made this too important to ignore when studying the e￿ect of political advertising. Through this
comprehensive data set, we are able to jointly assess the e￿ect of various campaign activities and the
possible synergy e￿ects that they have on each other.
We model individuals’ voting preferences via a random coe￿cient aggregate discrete-choice model,
which allows various campaign e￿ects to di￿er based on voter characteristics. Further, we apply the
instrumental variables technique to account for the endogeneity concerns associated with campaign ex-
posures. Our results show that, after controlling for heterogeneity and endogeneity, ground campaigning
and advertising both have positive e￿ects on voter preferences. The elasticity for ￿eld operations is esti-
mated to be 0.011 for the Republicans and 0.037 for the Democrats, suggesting an asymmetrical e￿ect
across parties. The elasticity of candidates’ own ads is 0.136 and 0.206 for the Republicans and the
Democrats, respectively, whereas the elasticity of outside ads is 0.043 and 0.019 for the Republicans and
the Democrats, respectively. We also ￿nd evidence that campaign e￿ectiveness depends on voters’ base-
5line partisan preferences: ￿eld operations, which often involve volunteers making face-to-face contacts
with potential voters, are more e￿ective among more-partisan (both Democrat-leaning and Republican-
leaning) voters, while candidates’ own advertising, which is impersonal mass-media communication, is
more e￿ective among non-partisans. Interestingly, we ￿nd that outside ads, consisting primarily of nega-
tive ads and attacking messages, behave more like ￿eld operations than candidates’ own ads, suggesting
an interaction between the tone of ads and voters’ partisan preferences.
To determine the importance of campaign marketing activities on election results, we conduct coun-
terfactual analyses based on our parameter estimates. Overall, our estimates suggest that campaigns
play an essential role in deciding the outcome of an election. Had campaign activities not been allowed in
presidential elections, history would have been rewritten, with a di￿erent president being elected in 2008
and in 2012. In particular, ￿eld operations, which accounted for roughly 30% of the votes Obama won,
can indeed be credited with his successes in 2008 and 2012. Interestingly, in the 2004 election, had the
Democrats received more outside advertising, the election would have ended up in an electoral college tie
with 269 electoral votes on each side.
Our paper makes two key contributions. First, we jointly examine the e￿ectiveness of mass-media
advertising and personal selling, two of the most important marketing activities that are used to reach,
persuade and, thus, win over customers. While extant studies have focused primarily on planning re-
sources across channels (Narayanan et al. 2004), little is known about the optimal marketing strategy
within the channel. Our results shed light not only on the relative e￿ectiveness of channels, but also
on the customer segment for which each channel is more e￿ective. Thus, our study can guide resource
allocation both across channels and within a channel across customer segments. Second, our paper con-
tributes to the study of political campaigns. Our compiled data set is by far the most comprehensive,
in that it includes detailed data on advertising and personal selling spanning multiple election years. In
addition, to the best our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to jointly analyze the causal e￿ects of multiple
campaign activities at such a granular level. Our results show that campaigns play a vital role in any
election. This disputes the ￿minimum e￿ect￿ belief that voter behaviors are pre-determined and that
campaigns can hardly alter election results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes various campaign activities and
6the data used for empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the model speci￿cation, and Section 4 describes the
identi￿cation and the estimation procedure. Section 5 discusses the results and counterfactual analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
We compile a unique data set from multiple sources that includes actual voting outcomes and campaign
activities for the 2004, 2008, and 2012 U.S. presidential elections. Our data are superior to those used in
extant studies in at least four aspects. First, our data cover a span of three presidential elections and,
thus, do not con￿ne our results to a particular candidate. Second, our collection of multiple campaign
activities encompasses a more comprehensive record of mass-media advertising and ground campaigning
than ever seen before in previous studies. Knowing where and to what extent candidates choose to
campaign enables us to assess the e￿ect of various campaign activities after controlling for one another.
Third, our unit of analysis is at the county level, which is as granular as it can be to reliably measure
voting results. Our campaign activities are also measured at the most granular level. Finally, we utilize
registered party a￿liation at the county level to examine how various campaign e￿ects di￿er according
to the level of voter partisanship. Using disaggregated data rather than state-level data to conduct the
analysis helps control for a potential aggregation bias. This, along with the use of voter partisanship,
allows us to generate optimal resource-allocation strategies in a more targeted manner.
2.1 Election Votes
The dependent variable for this study is the number of votes cast in each county for the presidential
candidates in each election. We collect the vote results data from the CQ Press Voting and Elections
Collection, a data base that tracks major U.S. political elections.
We de￿ne each county as a ￿market,￿ for which we calculate the candidates’ vote shares in each
election. In the subsequent analysis, we will use ￿market￿ and ￿county￿ interchangeably. We de￿ne a
county’s ￿market size￿ as the total number of resident citizens aged 18 and above, which is referred to as
7Table 1: Summary Statistics for Vote Outcomes by County
Party N Mean SD Min Max Total
Votes
2004 Democrat 3,111 18,901.6 65,677.9 18 1,907,736 58,802,968
Republican 3,111 19,866.3 47,586.2 82 1,076,225 61,804,121
2008 Democrat 3,106 22,289.4 77,146.0 8 2,295,853 69,230,895
Republican 3,106 19,221.2 44,882.7 94 956,425 59,701,115
2012 Democrat 3,108 21,126.5 74,225.0 5 2,216,903 65,661,169
Republican 3,108 19,537.0 44,788.5 84 885,333 60,721,119
Vote shares
2004 Democrat 3,111 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.58
Republican 3,111 0.35 0.09 0.05 0.76
2008 Democrat 3,106 0.25 0.10 0.04 0.64
Republican 3,106 0.33 0.09 0.04 0.78
2012 Democrat 3,108 0.22 0.10 0.02 0.70
Republican 3,108 0.33 0.10 0.02 0.73
Combined votes
2004 3,111 38,768.0 109,873.9 155 2,983,961.0 120,607,089
2008 3,106 41,510.6 118,263.5 159 3,252,278.0 128,932,010
2012 3,108 40,663.5 114,907.8 144 3,102,236.0 126,382,288
Turnout rate
2004 3,111 0.57 0.09 0.19 0.98
2008 3,106 0.58 0.09 0.16 0.90
2012 3,108 0.55 0.09 0.15 0.99
Note: We calculate the turnout rate as the sum of votes for the Democrat and the Republican candidates
divided by the number of resident citizens aged 18 and above. The vote share for each candidate is calculated
as the ratio of his received votes divided by the number of resident citizens aged 18 and above.
the Voting Age Population (VAP)6. We obtain the county-level age-speci￿c population counts from the
U.S. census data base.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the actual vote outcomes for each election 7. The Republican
candidate, George W. Bush, won more of the popular votes in the 2004 election, and the Democratic
candidate, Barack H. Obama, won more of the popular votes in the 2008 and 2012 elections. The average
vote share, calculated as the number of votes for each candidate divided by the county’s VAP, is always
higher for the Republican candidates. This is because the Republicans won many less-populated counties.
6A perhaps better measure of the market size for a county is the Voting Eligible Population (VEP), which equals the
VAP minus ineligible felons. This metric, however, is available only at the state level. For a good introduction on how to
estimate the Voting Eligible Population, see the United States Elections Project (http://elections.gmu.edu/index.html).
7There are a total of 3,144 counties and county equivalents in the United States. We exclude Alaska from the analysis
because, there, the voting outcomes and population estimates are measured by di￿erent geographical units and are chal-
lenging to match. As a result, we end up with 3,110 counties from 49 states plus the District of Columbia, which is treated
as a single county in the analysis.
8Even with a higher average vote share at the county level, the Republicans still lost to the Democrats in
total popular and electoral votes at the national level in 2008 and 2012.
2.2 Ground Campaigning
To average voters, presidential elections are perhaps most visible on the ground level through personal
selling activities (henceforth, we will use ground campaigning and personal selling interchangeably). In the
early stage of each election, presidential candidates establish ￿eld operations to organize voter outreach;
in particular, campaign teams set up ￿eld o￿ces from which sta￿ and volunteers plan their door-to-door
canvassing e￿orts and other in-person voter visits. We measure the scale of candidates’ ￿eld operations
by the number of ￿eld o￿ces they deploy in each county. We collect the 2004 and 2008 ￿eld o￿ce data
from the ￿Democracy in Action￿ project hosted by George Washington University 8 and the 2012 data
from Newsweek Daily Beast, 9 both of which scoured the Democratic and Republican campaign websites
and gathered addresses for all of the ￿eld o￿ces. We then use the Geographic Information System (GIS)
software to map the o￿ce addresses onto the corresponding county.
Table 2 presents some summary statistics for ￿eld operations. In all elections, the Democratic party
had an indisputable lead in establishing ￿eld operations: the ratio of the Democratic and Republican
￿eld o￿ces was 3.51, 3.53, and 2.69 in 2004, 2008, and 2012, respectively. Furthermore, the allocation
of ￿eld o￿ces seems even more prominent in the two Obama campaigns than in the Kerry campaign:
while the latter had at least one o￿ce in 237 (8%) counties, the former set up ￿eld o￿ces in 624 (20%)
counties in 2008 and 439 (14%) in 2012.
2.3 Television Advertising
In the U.S., three types of players are primarily responsible for presidential election advertisements:
the candidates, their party committees￿namely, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the
Republican National Committee (RNC)￿and outside political groups. Because the candidates and party
committees often coordinate advertising e￿orts, we combine the ads of these two types of players and
label them as the candidates’ own advertisements.
8The URL for the project is: http://www.gwu.edu/~action. Accessed on 8/2/2013.
9The explanation of the data tracking method can be found at http://newsbeastlabs.tumblr.com/post/34109019268/tracking-
the-presidential-groundgame-as-the-two. Accessed on 8/6/2013.
9Table 2: Ground Campaigning by County
N Mean SD Min Max Total
Number of ￿eld o￿ces
2004 Democrat 3,111 0.10 0.45 0 12 313
Republican 3,111 0.03 0.23 0 5 89
2008 Democrat 3,106 0.28 0.75 0 11 874
Republican 3,106 0.08 0.46 0 17 247
2012 Democrat 3,108 0.24 0.93 0 21 750
Republican 3,108 0.09 0.37 0 6 278
Presence of ￿eld o￿ces
2004 Democrat 3,111 0.08 0.27 0 1 237
Republican 3,111 0.02 0.14 0 1 65
2008 Democrat 3,106 0.20 0.40 0 1 624
Republican 3,106 0.06 0.24 0 1 192
2012 Democrat 3,108 0.14 0.35 0 1 439
Republican 3,108 0.07 0.26 0 1 222
Note: We summarize the ground campaigning activities by county. Field operations are measured
through the number of ￿eld o￿ces in each county. We also report the number of counties that had
at least one ￿eld o￿ce.
The third type of player￿outside political groups, also known as the Political Action Committees
(PACs)￿buy television ad spots to support their preferred and to oppose their rival candidates. Al-
though political groups have played a role in presidential elections for decades, they took on a much
greater prominence in recent elections, partly because, in 2001, a campaign ￿nance reform law set stricter
restrictions on fund-raising and spending and, hence, the PACs stepped in to ￿ll the gap. Especially in
the 2012 election, a relatively new kind of organization, the Super PAC, emerged as a major in￿uencer.
Super PACs are made up of independent PACs that support a candidate with unlimited￿and often
anonymous￿donations from unions, companies, or individuals. Due to the large number of PACs that
advertise in the presidential elections, it is challenging to track all of their ads. We, however, are able to
obtain the advertising data for the top spenders, which, combined, are responsible for more than 90% of
the total ad spending by the PACs.
We measure the amount of advertising using gross rating points (GRPs), which quantify advertising
impressions as a percentage of the targeted audience reached. For example, if an advertisement that airs
in the Des Moines-Ames area reaches 25% of the total population, it receives a GRP value of 25; if the
same advertisement were aired ￿ve times, the GRP value would be 125 (= 5  25). GRPs are a better
10measure of ad exposures than dollar spending because the price of advertising varies signi￿cantly across
markets. For example, the same amount of ad dollars would yield far fewer exposures in Los Angeles
than in Kansas City. Hence, GRPs provide a measure of audience reach, independent of the advertising
cost.
We obtain television advertising both for candidates and for PACs from Nielsen Media Research.
Nielsen divides the U.S. media market into 210 designated market areas (DMA): residents from the
same DMA receive largely the same television o￿erings, including advertising. Therefore, our advertising
metrics are measured at the DMA level. It is noteworthy that the outcome variable of interest is at the
county level, with each county belonging to one and only one DMA. To link ad impressions to county-level
votes, we assume that the percent of the audience reached in a county equals the percent of the audience
reached in the DMA to which the county belongs. Take the Rochester-Manson City-Austin DMA,
for example: This DMA consists of seven counties from Iowa (Cerro Gordo, Floyd, Hancock, Howard,
Mitchell, Winnebago, and Worth) and ￿ve counties from Minnesota (Dodge, Fillmore, Freeborn, Mower,
and Olmsted). During the week of October 21, 2012, Obama campaign ads reached 1048.8% of the DMA
population. By assuming that advertising impressions are homogeneous within a DMA, we assign the
Democratic candidate’s own GRP value to be 1048.8 for each of the twelve counties during that week.
Because voting preference is revealed on Election Day, we calculate the cumulative GRPs that each
DMA has received since September 1 and use this cumulative measure in the subsequent analysis. Table 3
presents the summary statistics for candidates’ own advertisements and PAC advertisements, respectively.
For candidates’ own advertising, the Democrats have always had more ads than the Republicans, by 20%,
50%, and 40% in the three elections, respectively. Interestingly, the PACs, which bought fewer ads than
the candidates in 2004 and 2008, played a much bigger role in the 2012 election. In particular, the PACs
supporting the Romney candidacy were responsible for roughly 46% of the total ads for Romney and
outnumbered the PAC ads supporting the Obama candidacy by almost seven times. Even though the
Obama campaign bought more ads than the Romney campaign, the PACs ￿lled the gap; in the end,
11Table 3: Television Advertising by DMA
N Mean SD Min Max Total
Candidates’ own advertising (GRPs)
2004 Democrat 206 3,362.5 4,268.0 0 16,120 692,665
Republican 206 2,754.0 3,204.2 0 11,579 567,316
2008 Democrat 206 5,576.5 4,760.6 255 18,418 1,148,754
Republican 206 3,628.8 3,713.1 77 17,965 747,530
2012 Democrat 206 3,296.0 4,941.1 0 19,849 678,971
Republican 206 2,390.0 3,611.8 0 19,597 492,346
PAC advertising (GRPs)
2004 Democrat 206 255.9 505.0 0 2,248 52,726
Republican 206 394.4 866.2 0 4,023 81,250
2008 Democrat 206 159.4 407.3 0 2,513 32,830
Republican 206 217.2 435.7 0 2,188 44,736
2012 Democrat 206 254.3 694.6 0 3,840 52,378
Republican 206 2,030.9 2,714.9 67 12,137 418,356
Total advertising (GRPs)
2004 Democrat 206 3,618.4 4,627.9 0 16,726 745,390
Republican 206 3,148.4 3,773.8 0 12,413 648,566
2008 Democrat 206 5,735.8 4,951.8 255 19,592 1,181,583
Republican 206 3,846.0 3,965.4 77 19,704 792,267
2012 Democrat 206 3,550.2 5,533.5 0 22,943 731,349
Republican 206 4,420.9 6,091.8 67 29,295 910,702
Note: We measure television advertising using Gross Rating Points (GRPs), which correspond to the percent of target
reached in each Designated Market Area (DMA). For PACs, we obtain data from the top spenders, which are responsible
for more than 90% of total PAC ad spending for each election. The total number of DMAs excludes those in Alaska.
12Table 4: Summary Statistics of Additional Variables
N Mean SD Min Max
Median household income ($)
2004 3,111 46,458.1 12,258.3 20,193 121,266
2008 3,106 46,528.0 12,333.4 19,744 122,822
2012 3,108 44,901.4 11,550.4 19,624 122,844
Unemployment rate
2004 3,111 0.07 0.03 0 0.36
2008 3,106 0.08 0.03 0 0.28
2012 3,108 0.09 0.04 0 0.27
Registered partisans
2004 Democrat 1,318 0.35 0.17 0.06 0.98
Republican 1,318 0.33 0.16 0.03 0.90
2008 Democrat 1,319 0.35 0.16 0.06 1.00
Republican 1,319 0.33 0.15 0.03 0.93
2012 Democrat 1,349 0.31 0.16 0.02 0.97
Republican 1,349 0.33 0.15 0.03 0.87
Note: Median household income and unemployment rate are obtained from the American Com-
munity Survey data base. Data on registered voters by party are compiled from various o￿cial
government sources. Some states do not require voters to declare party a￿liation.
25-percent more pro-Romney ads were aired than pro-Obama ads in the 2012 election.
2.4 Additional Variables
We collect two county-level observed characteristics: the median household income and the unemployment
rate, both of which re￿ect the county’s economic well-being and, thus, serve as contextual variables that
may a￿ect political preferences. The variables are extracted from the United States Census Bureau’s
online databases. Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.
For each county, we also obtain the number of residents registered as Democrats or Republicans
during an election. Based on this variable we simulate the individual-level partisan support that each
party receives during an election season. 10
10Because not all states require voters to declare party a￿liation during registration, we have such data for only 27 states
in 2004 and 2008 and 28 states in 2012. Data come from a repository tracking the U.S. elections (http://uselectionatlas.org/,
accessed on 1/20/2014), where partisan numbers are extracted from various o￿cial websites such as the state’s Secretary
of State or the O￿ce of Elections.
13Figure 1: Vote Shares versus Ground Campaigning
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2.5 Preliminary Evidence
2.5.1 Model-free Evidence of Campaign E￿ects
In this section, we present some model-free evidence and reduced-form regression results. First, we
examine how ground campaigning and television advertising are related to vote shares. Because both
political preferences and campaign activities vary signi￿cantly across regions, we calculate the changes
in variables between elections to control for the cross-sectional variation across counties.
Figure 1 depicts the relation between vote shares and the scale of ground campaigning. The vertical
axis of the ￿gure corresponds to the change in vote shares from one election to the next￿i.e., scj;t+1 scj;t,
where vote shares in county c for party j during election t is calculated as the vote counts for the party
candidate divided by county c’s VAP. In Figure 1, the horizontal axis is the di￿erence in the number of
￿eld o￿ces in county c for party j￿i.e., Gcj;t+1   Gcj;t￿and each dot corresponds to a county-party
combination. We show the scatter plot and the best-￿tting non-parametric polynomial curve with its
95% con￿dence interval. The ￿gure exhibits a positive relation: a candidate’s vote share in a county
increased as he or she deploys more ￿eld o￿ces. The positive trend tails o￿ and turns downward at the
far right end; the decline is, perhaps, largely driven by a few outlier counties in which the competition was
intense, and the candidates added ￿ve or more ￿eld o￿ces. For example, in Broward County, Florida, the
Democrats increased ￿eld o￿ces from four in 2008 to ten in 2012. Due to the intensity of the competition,
however, the Democrats’ vote share dropped slightly, from 36.6% to 35.7%.
Similarly, Figure 2 depicts the changes in vote shares against the changes in advertising. We plot
14Figure 2: Vote Shares versus Television Advertising
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(b) PAC Ads
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in Figure 2a, ads made by the candidates and their national committees, and in Figure 2b, those by
the PACs. The horizontal axis corresponds to the changes in advertising GRPs in each county and the
vertical axis corresponds to changes in vote shares. Once again, we observe a positive trend: a candidate’s
vote share goes up with an increase in advertising; this holds true for both the candidate’s own ads and
PAC ads. It is highly likely that both advertising and ground operations are endogenous of which the
￿gures above do not take into account. We use the ￿gures merely to illustrate that there can be a relation
between vote shares and campaign exposures. We correct the endogeneity concerns related to campaign
activities in our main model in Section 3.
Figures 1 and 2 also indicate that both ground campaigning and television advertising vary across
elections, illustrating that we have a su￿cient amount of variations in our data for identi￿cation.
2.5.2 Campaign Channel Synergy
The next questions to naturally ask are: What is the relative e￿ectiveness of various campaign activities,
and what is the synergy between them? To provide preliminary answers to those questions, we show
two reduced-form regression speci￿cations: Column 1 in Table 5 reports the main e￿ect for various
campaign activities estimated in an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression; and column 2 presents
channel synergies as estimated by the interactions between campaign activities (Naik and Peters 2009).
The dependent variable here is the log of county-level vote shares.
We begin by discussing the main e￿ects. The coe￿cient estimate for ￿eld operations is positive and
15signi￿cant, suggesting that a larger scale of ￿eld operations is associated with higher vote shares. With
regard to advertising, we log-transform the advertising variables to capture potential diminishing returns.
The coe￿cients are estimated to be positive and signi￿cant for both candidates’ own ads and PAC ads.
Next, we assess the possible synergy e￿ect of di￿erent campaign activities (see column 2 of Table
5). First, we see that ground campaigning has a positive synergy with candidates’ own advertising,
suggesting that ground campaigning and the candidates’ advertising complement each other. This is
perhaps not surprising because these two channels utilize vastly di￿erent marketing tactics: the former
relies primarily on personalized messages delivered via face-to-face contacts while the latter uses less-
targeted communication. Second, the interaction between ground campaigning and PAC ads is negative
and signi￿cant, suggesting that PAC ads seem to work as substitutes for ground campaigning. This ￿nding
that the two types of ads exhibit di￿erent synergy e￿ects with ground campaigning is quite interesting:
while a candidate’s ￿eld operations seem to strengthen the e￿ect of his or her own advertising campaigns,
they substitute for the advertising e￿orts by the supporting PACs. Finally, we see that the interaction
between candidates’ own advertising and PAC advertising is insigni￿cant, thus providing no evidence of
any synergetic e￿ects with di￿erent types of advertisements.
2.5.3 Voter Heterogeneity
Why would the various campaign activities exhibit the above-illustrated synergies? Can it be that
di￿erent campaign activities a￿ect di￿erent types of voters? To investigate this further, we turn our
attention to voter partisanship, a characteristic that is essential in identifying voters’ baseline political
preferences. For each county-election combination, we calculate the percent of resident citizens who are
registered as either a Democrat or a Republican. We then categorize a county as a high (low)-Democrat
county if the percentage of registered Democrats there is above (below) the mean, and vice versa for
the high-Republican and low-Republican counties. Figure 3 depicts the relation between vote shares and
￿eld operations, separated into counties with a low or high percent of partisan support, respectively.
Again, for illustration, we show a scatter plot and the best-￿tting non-parametric polynomial with its
95% con￿dence interval. The solid and dashed lines represent counties with high and low partisanship,
respectively. We see that while both lines exhibit a positive trend, the solid line has a much steeper
16Table 5: OLS Regression Results on Campaign E￿ects
(1) (2) (3)
￿eld operations 0.066*** -0.038 0.040***
(0.005) (0.028) (0.006)
candidates’ own ads 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
PAC ads 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
(￿eld operations)(candidates’ own ads) 0.016***
(0.003)
(￿eld operations)(PAC ads) -0.007***
(0.001)
(candidates’ own ads)(PAC ads) -0.000
(0.000)
(￿eld operations)(partisan support) 0.165***
(0.039)
(candidates’ own ads)(partisan support) -0.079***
(0.008)
(PAC ads)(partisan support) 0.017**
(0.008)
partisan support 2.427***
(0.069)
other variables (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Fixed E￿ects Yes Yes Yes
N 18,650 18,650 7,972
R2 0.57 0.57 0.70
Note: Results are from Ordinary Least Squares regression. The county-level socio-demographic
variables are controlled for but reported. The ￿xed e￿ects are DMA-party level dummy variables.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10
17Figure 3: E￿ect of Ground Campaigning for Low-Partisan and High-Partisan Counties
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slope, suggesting that ￿eld operations seem to have a stronger e￿ect in counties with a higher percent of
partisan voters.
In the same vein, we run a reduced-form analysis in which we regress the log of vote shares on the
interaction between campaign activities and the percent of partisan support. Estimates are reported in
column 3 of Table 5. We see that the level of partisan support in a county has a negative interaction
with candidates’ own ads and a positive interaction with PAC ads. Further, consistent with Figure 3,
we see that there is a positive interaction e￿ect between ground campaigning and the level of partisan
support. These reduced-form results suggest that di￿erent campaign activities can have di￿erent e￿ects
depending on initial voter preferences, speci￿cally partisan support.
3 Model of Voter Preference
We posit that individual i who lives in county c has latent voting utility that she associates with the
candidate from party j during election t, denoted as uicjt. An individual faces three voting options the
Democratic candidate, the Republican candidate, and the outside option, which refers to voting for
an independent candidate or choosing not to vote. Individual i is assumed to choose the option that
yields the highest utility, and market shares are revealed from aggregating over individual choices. The
conditional indirect utility that voter i receives, uicjt, is speci￿ed as
uicjt =  i(Gcjt;Acjt) + i + Xct + mj + cjt + t + "icjt: (1)
18The ￿rst component,  i(Gcjt;Acjt), captures how individual i’s goodwill towards candidate j is af-
fected by how much she is exposed to the candidate’s ground campaigning, Gcjt, and mass-media adver-
tising, Acjt. Because individuals may have diverse tastes for political campaigns, we allow heterogeneity
in tastes and denote the e￿ect with a subscript i. We will explain the speci￿cation for this campaign
e￿ect in Section 3.1.
The second component, i, captures the remaining individual-speci￿c heterogeneity in political pref-
erences. It can be understood as the mean voting utility for individual i that is not explained by her
exposures to election campaigns. This term can be further decomposed into three components: (1) the
grand mean across individuals, 1; (2) the deviation from the mean that could be attributed to individ-
ual observed characteristics, 2Dijt; and (3) the individual departure from the mean related to all other
unobserved individual characteristics, 
i , where we assume that 
i comes from a standard normal
distribution. We allow the three terms to enter utility such that i = 1 + 2Dijt + 
i . Examples of
the unobserved characteristics could include, for example, whether the individual gets a salary increase
or loses her health insurance, which probably will shape her taste towards presidential campaigns but are
usually missing from the data.
The ￿rst and second components in equation (1) capture the heterogeneity in voting utility that could
be attributed to observed or unobserved individual characteristics. The next four components describe
the candidate-speci￿c and market-speci￿c terms common to all individuals.
The term Xct captures how the voting utility is a￿ected by observed county-election speci￿c char-
acteristics. Examples of such variables include the county’s economic conditions such as the median
household income and the unemployment rate, both of which could in￿uence an individual’s goodwill
towards a presidential candidate.
Next, uicjt is also a function of unobserved characteristics related to a speci￿c county-party-election
combination. This is further decomposed into three parts: mj, cjt, and t, which correspond to the
fourth, ￿fth, and sixth components of the voting utility speci￿cation. mj refers to the mean utility
toward the candidate from party j across all the residents in the same media market m. People from the
same media market likely exhibit similar political preferences due to exposures to the same media content
(including news coverages) over time, as well as to similar contextual conditions such as economic well-
19being. It is challenging to collect all potential factors in the data. Thus, we use the mean market-party
utility, mj, to absorb the cross-sectional variations in political preference.
The ￿fth component, cjt, is the county-party-election speci￿c deviation from the mean utility, mj,
which quanti￿es the hard-to-measure utility shift over time. For example, residents in Arizona counties
likely view the incumbent Arizona senator John McCain more favorably than Mitt Romney, even though
both were Republican presidential candidates. Or, consider another example: When Hurricane Sandy hit
the Northeast region of the United States days before the Election in 2012, President Obama promptly
committed to the relief operations and was praised for his crisis leadership, causing a positive boost
in his support. Such unobserved factors would not be re￿ected in mj but would be captured through
cjt. It is noteworthy that this county-party-election speci￿c deviation, which is unobserved by the
econometrician, is assumed to be observed by the voters and the candidates. This potentially creates an
endogeneity problem for estimating the parameters in  i(Gcjt;Acjt). We will discuss our solution to this
problem in Section 4.
The sixth component of utility is t, which captures the election-speci￿c shocks to voting utility
that is common to all county-party combinations. And, ￿nally, "icjt is the idiosyncratic utility shock
that is assumed to be independently and identically distributed Type I extreme value across individuals,
counties, candidates, and time.
3.1 Speci￿cation of Campaign E￿ects
We postulate that the campaign e￿ect,  i(Gcjt;Acjt), is a function of candidates’ ground campaigning
and mass-media advertising. As previously discussed, ground-level campaigning takes the form of ￿eld
operations, Gcjt, and advertising has two primary types: own ads aired by the candidates and their
parties, Ao
cjt, and outside ads aired by the PACs, A
p
cjt. We allow various campaign activities to have a
heterogeneous e￿ect across individuals: the e￿ectiveness of campaigning may vary according to individual
characteristics.
To sum up, we specify the campaign e￿ect in the following form:
 i(Gcjt;Acjt) = iGcjt + iAo
cjt + iA
p
cjt: (2)
20The parameter, i, corresponds to the voter’s taste towards ￿eld operations and consists of three
components: (1) the mean taste across individuals, 1; (2) the deviation from the mean that could
be attributed to observed individual characteristics, 2Dijt; and (3) the individual departure from the
mean related to all unobserved individual characteristics, 

i . Similarly, we decompose the other taste
parameters into three components such that,
i = 1 + 2Dijt + 

i ;
i = 1 + 2Dijt + 

i ;
i = 1 + 2Dijt + 
i ;
(3)
where each unobserved characteristic i is assumed to come from a standard normal distribution. We
assume that the observed individual characteristic￿level of partisan support for candidate j￿Dijt comes
from a log-normal distribution with mean of the partisan level in each county. That is, if a speci￿c county
had 30% registered Democrats, we assume that the distribution of Democratic support by individuals
would come from a log-normal distribution where the mean of the corresponding normal distribution
would be log(0.3)-0.5 with unit variance.
3.2 Distributional Assumptions and Implied Market Shares
From equations (1), (2), and (3), the utility function can be speci￿ed as
uicjt = 1 + 2Dijt + 
i
+(1 + 2Dijt + 

i )Gcjt
+(1 + 2Dijt + 

i )Ao
cjt + (1 + 2Dijt + 
i )A
p
cjt
+Xct + mj + cjt + t + "icjt
: (4)
Further, we can decompose equation (4) as
uicjt = (Gcjt;Ao
cjt;A
p
cjt;Xct;1)
+(Gcjt;Ao
jct;A
p
cjt;Dijt;i;2) + "icjt;
(5)
where 1 = (1;1;1;1;;mj;cjt;t) and 2 = (2;2;2;2;;;;).
Hence, the utility is expressed in two parts: the mean utility across individuals, cjt = 1 +1Gcjt +
211Ao
cjt + 1A
p
cjt + Xct + mj + cjt + t , and the individual departure from the mean, icjt =
(2Dijt + 
i ) + (2Dijt + 

i )Gcjt + (2Dijt + 

i )Ao
cjt + (2Dijt + 
i )A
p
cjt.
We assume that "icjt follows an i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution, and normalize the utility for
the outside option to uic0t = 0+"ic0t. Based on the distributional assumption of the idiosyncratic shocks
and the utility speci￿cation stated above, the probability of voter i who resides in county c voting for the
candidate from party j is given as
sicjt =
exp(
 
Gcjt;Ao
cjt;A
p
cjt;Xct;1

+ 
 
Gcjt;Ao
cjt;A
p
cjt;Dijt;i;2

)
1 +
P2
k=1 exp( (Gckt;Ao
ckt;A
p
ckt;Xct;1) + (Gckt;Ao
ckt;A
p
ckt;Dikt;i;2))
 (6)
We can obtain the county-level vote share by integrating over individuals such that
scjt =
 exp
 

 
Gcjt;Ao
cjt;A
p
cjt;Xct;1

+ 
 
Gcjt;Ao
cjt;A
p
cjt;D;;2

1 +
P2
k=1 exp( (Gckt;Ao
ckt;A
p
ckt;Xct;1) + (Gckt;Ao
ckt;A
p
ckt;D;;2))
dP (D)dP ();
where P(D) and P() are the distributions for the demographic variables, fDi1t;Di2tg, and the
idiosyncratic disturbances, i, respectively. Because we observe only the county-level aggregated statistics
for D but not its true distribution, we use the empirical distribution ^ P(D) to approximate the true
distribution.
4 Identi￿cation and Estimation
Based on our model speci￿cation outlined in the previous section, we estimate a model of voters’ candidate
choice that allows di￿erent campaign e￿ects for voters with di￿erent levels of baseline partisan preference.
Our estimation strategy closely resembles the generalized methods of moments (GMM; see Hansen
1982) approach developed in several classic papers employing discrete-choice models that use aggregated
data (e.g., Berry 1994; Berry et al. 1995; Nevo 2000). This approach has been utilized in many marketing
applications (e.g., Sudhir 2001; Gordon and Hartmann 2013; Chung 2013). The estimation essentially
relies on two distinct sets of moments. The ￿rst set of moments matches the model’s predicted market
shares to those observed in the data such that
22^ scjt(();)   scjt = 0; j = 1;2: (7)
The second set of moments relates to the market-level disturbance, cjt￿i.e., the county-party-
election speci￿c deviation from the mean utility. As previously discussed, cjt is assumed to be unob-
served by the econometrician but is assumed to be observed by the candidates and voters, potentially
causing an endogeneity problem. In other words, if these demand disturbances are correlated with the
campaign activities￿i.e., Gcjt, Ao
cjt, and A
p
cjt￿which is highly likely, the estimates of campaign e￿ects
would be biased. A common approach would be to choose appropriate instrumental variables that are
correlated with ground campaigning and advertising but uncorrelated with the disturbances, cjt. In
the following sections, we discuss our choice of instrumental variables and present the computational
algorithm we use for our estimation.
4.1 The Choice of Instrumental Variables
For advertising, we use lagged ad prices as instrumental variables for both the candidates’ own advertising
and PAC advertising. Speci￿cally, we use the 3rd-quarter DMA-level ad prices in the year before each
election. The argument for this instrument is that price changes a￿ect cost and, therefore, shift the
demand for advertising, but the price ￿uctuation is assumed to be independent of jct. We use prices
from the previous year instead of from the election year to eliminate the possibility that price changes
can be due to the changing demand of advertising in an ad-￿lled election year. Our ad-price data come
from the Kantar Media SRDS TV and Cable Source, and we collect prices for three dayparts: prime
access, prime, and late news.
We use the real estate rental price in each county the year before the election to instrument ￿eld oper-
ations. The identi￿cation argument is similar to that of using lagged ad prices to instrument advertising.
Speci￿cally, lagged rental prices a￿ect the demand for o￿ce rental and, hence, should be correlated with
the number of ￿eld o￿ces, but not directly correlated with the unobserved common utility shocks.
234.2 MPEC Estimation
After choosing the set of instruments, Z, we form the moment condition g() = Z0  and minimize the
GMM objective function such that: ^  = argmin g()0Wg(), where W is a weight matrix.
As discussed, the ￿rst set of moments matches the predicted and the observed vote shares￿i.e.,
^ sjct(cjt();) sjct = 0. The predicted share, ^ sjct, is a function of not only the structural parameters,
, but also the market-level disturbances, cjt(). A popular approach in utilizing this set of moments
is the nested ￿xed-point (NFXP) algorithm, which conducts an inner-loop contraction mapping step to
explicitly solve for the vector cjt() such that ^ sjct matches sjct, and an outer-loop optimization over the
structural parameters. Because the contraction mapping has to be done for every guess of the structural
parameters, the NFXP method is computationally demanding, and the estimation also depends on the
pre-speci￿ed precision level to which the predicted market shares should match the observed shares. To
overcome these limitations, Dube et al. (2012) proposed a new computational approach referred to as
the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The idea is to treat the ￿rst set of
moments as constraints and run a constrained optimization of the GMM objective function such that
min(; ; g) g0Wg
subject to ^ s(;) = s
g = Z0:
We implement the MPEC estimation using the KNITRO solver, a state-of-the-art commercial op-
timization tool that can be called from Matlab. Our estimation is achieved by minimizing the GMM
objective function over a large number of parameters. The main advantage of the MPEC algorithm is to
avoid the time-consuming contraction mapping step in the inner-loop of the NFXP. A potential problem,
however, is the number of dimensions for the optimization problem. The total number of parameters
for MPEC equals the sum of three components: the number of structural parameters ( 1;2); the num-
ber of market disturbances (jct); and the number of GMM moments (g), which equals the number
of instruments, Zjct.11 When the number of parameters is large, the algorithm needs to construct a
11Our optimization includes 19,497 parameters: 419 linear parameters, 8 non-linear parameters, 18,650 market-level dis-
turbances, and 420 GMM moments. We simulated 1,000 individual draws in each market. The tolerance of the optimization
was set to be 10 6. The estimation converged after 6.9 CPU hours on a workstation with 32 GB RAM.
24high-dimensional Hessian matrix and Jacobian matrix for the constraints, which are memory-intensive.
However, because we have a large number of independent markets with only two candidates per market,
our Jacobian and Hessian matrices contain many zeros: there are 97.8% and 99.8% zero cells, respectively.
Hence, our computation bene￿ts tremendously from specifying the sparse pattern of the Jacobian and
the Hessian matrices. We refer readers to Dube et al. (2012) and their online appendix for details on
implementing MPEC for aggregated discrete-choice models.
5 Results
5.1 Parameter estimates
We estimate four speci￿cations and present the results in Table 6. The ￿rst two speci￿cations estimate
the e￿ect of ground campaigning and advertising in an OLS regression with and without DMA-party
￿xed e￿ects, respectively. The third speci￿cation incorporates the instruments, and the fourth allows
heterogeneous campaign e￿ects over individual voters.
We begin with a brief discussion of the OLS estimates (see columns 1 and 2). First, adding ￿xed e￿ects
increases the model R-squared almost threefold; therefore, in the subsequent sections, we will always
discuss the estimates with the ￿xed e￿ects included. Estimates in column 2 shed light on the campaign
e￿ect, although not accounting for endogeneity. With the presence of ￿xed e￿ects, ￿eld operations are
still found to have a positive e￿ect on voter preferences. We also identify positive and signi￿cant e￿ects
for candidates’ own advertising and PAC advertising.
Column 3 presents the estimates based on the instruments described in Section 4.1. The IV estimate
for ￿eld operations remains signi￿cant, indicating that ￿eld operations can boost voter preference towards
a candidate. The magnitude of the e￿ect almost triples compared to the OLS result, suggesting strong
endogeneity with ￿eld operations: candidates are more likely to implement ￿eld sta￿ where competition
is expected to be higher. Not accounting for endogeneity￿i.e., the strategic placements of ￿eld opera-
tions￿would lead to underestimating the e￿ect. We observe a similar pattern for candidates’ own ads,
for which the IV estimate remains signi￿cant with an even bigger magnitude than the OLS estimate.
The estimate for PAC ads, although greater in magnitude, is insigni￿cant at 0.05 level.
25Table 6: Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Est Est Est Est Partisan Sigma
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
￿eld operations 0.045*** 0.066*** 0.192*** -0.029 1.248*** 0.417**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.056) (0.060) (0.144) (0.181)
candidates’ own ads 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.098*** 0.081*** -0.210*** 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.024) (0.010) (0.078)
PAC ads 0.047*** 0.009*** 0.071 -0.047 0.181*** 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.047) (0.048) (0.010) (0.101)
year 2008 0.051*** 0.018** -0.185*** -0.164***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.052) (0.048)
year 2012 -0.157*** -0.094*** -0.196** -0.016
(0.010) (0.008) (0.088) (0.089)
median household income 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
unemployment rate -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
intercept -0.791*** -0.587*** -0.779*** -0.612*** 1.050*** 0.160
(0.024) (0.051) (0.122) (0.117) (0.060) (0.205)
DMA-Party Fixed E￿ects No Yes Yes Yes
Instruments No No Yes Yes
N 18,650 18,650 18,650 18,650
R2 0.14 0.57
Note: We report results from four speci￿cations. Column (1) estimates the marginal e￿ects of ground campaigning and
television advertising in OLS without ￿xed e￿ects; and column (2) with ￿xed e￿ects. Column (3) estimates the marginal
e￿ects with instruments. Column (4) incorporates heterogeneity of campaign e￿ects over voters. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *
p<0.10
26Speci￿cation (4) incorporates voter heterogeneity; in particular, we examine how the e￿ect of various
campaign activities depends on voters’ baseline partisan preferences. The ￿rst column under speci￿cation
(4) lists the parameter estimates of the main e￿ects; the second column is the estimated interaction
e￿ect with voter partisan preferences; and the third column corresponds to ^ , the estimated unobserved
heterogeneity in each campaign taste parameter.
We discover some interesting ￿ndings concerning the e￿ectiveness of each campaign activity in dif-
ferent voter segments. First, we estimate the main e￿ect of ￿eld operations to be insigni￿cant but their
interaction with voter baseline partisan preference to be signi￿cant and strong. This indicates that,
overall, ground campaigning can e￿ectively shape vote outcomes, more so for people with higher baseline
partisan preferences. In contrast, campaign advertising is found to have a positive and signi￿cant main
e￿ect but a negative interaction e￿ect with partisan preference. These estimates suggest that candidates’
own ads are more e￿ective for voters on the margin￿i.e., for those who have not yet developed a strong
partisan a￿liation with either party￿and that the e￿ect diminishes as partisan preference strengthens.
In other words, campaign ads sponsored by the candidates and party committees seem to serve as a tool
to persuade the non-decided, rather than to mobilize the likely supporters. Interestingly, PAC advertis-
ing is found to behave similarly to ground campaigning, with an insigni￿cant main e￿ect but a positive
interaction with voter partisan preference. It is noteworthy, though, that the magnitude of this interac-
tion is roughly a tenth of that for ￿eld operations. We interpret this to mean that PAC advertising is
e￿ective only with voters who have a strong baseline partisan preference; its e￿ect is null otherwise, which
perhaps explains the overall insigni￿cant main e￿ect for PAC ads when heterogeneity is not considered
(see column 3 of Table 6). Finally, voters’ baseline partisan preference is found to have a strong main
e￿ect: not surprisingly, Republican partisans tend to vote for the Republican candidates and Democratic
partisans for Democrats. Nevertheless, our estimates suggest that campaigns can still in￿uence vote
outcomes beyond voters’ baseline preferences.
5.2 Elasticity Estimates
In this section, we report the elasticities of various campaign activities. The ￿eld-operation elasticity,
de￿ned from the utility speci￿cation in equation (1), is
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which depends on the individual-speci￿c taste parameter for ￿eld operations, i, integrated over
individual voters. Elasticities for the other types of campaign activities are de￿ned similarly.
Table 7 presents the elasticity estimates based on our parameter estimates in speci￿cation (4) in Table
6. The numbers in the diagonal refer to the percent change in vote share in response to a 1% increase
in the party’s own campaign e￿orts; and those in the o￿-diagonal correspond to the change in a party’s
vote share resulting from a 1% increase in the rival’s campaign.
We begin with the elasticity estimates for advertising, as they are more straightforward to inter-
pret. The elasticity for candidates’ own ads is estimated to be 0.136 and 0.206 for the Republicans and
Democrats, respectively: a percent increase in the candidate’s own advertising would result in a 0.14
and 0.21 percent increase in vote shares for the Republicans and Democrats, respectively. Our elasticity
estimates are comparable in magnitude to those reported in Ackerberg (2001), which ￿nds an elasticity
of 0.15 for new products, a context similar to what we are studying here. The cross-ad elasticity esti-
mates are noticeably smaller than the own-ad elasticities. If the Democrats raise their campaign ads by
1%, the Republicans’ vote share will decrease by 0.06%; the decrease is estimated to be 0.08% for the
Democrats if the Republicans increase their campaign ads by 1%. The fact that the own-ad and cross-ad
elasticities for the Democrats are 50% higher in magnitude than those for the Republicans suggests that
the Democrats experience more elastic demand for campaign advertising.
Advertisements from PACs are found to have smaller elasticities on vote shares. Across all voters,
the PAC ad elasticities are found to be tiny, given the insigni￿cant main e￿ect ( ^ 1 =  0:047; p > 0:05)
and the modest interaction estimate ( ^ 2 = 0:181; p < 0:01). Thus, to gain insights into voters for whom
they do matter, we calculated the elasticity estimates for the voter segment with the top 20% partisan
preferences. The own-elasticity estimates for PAC advertisement are 0.043 for Republicans and 0.019 for
Democrats, and the cross-elasticity estimates are -0.007 and -0.017, respectively. These numbers indicate
an asymmetrical e￿ect across parties: with more PAC ads from their camp, the Republicans would expect
to gain more vote shares than the Democrats and, with more PAC ads from the rival’s, they would lose
less. This is in contrast to the e￿ect of candidates’ own advertising.
28Table 7: Elasticity Estimates for Ground Campaigning and Advertising
1% increase from
Focal party Republican Democrat
￿eld operations Republican 0.011 -0.018
Democrat -0.006 0.037
candidates’ own ads Republican 0.136 -0.055
Democrat -0.084 0.206
PAC ads Republican 0.043 -0.007
Democrat -0.017 0.019
Note: The elasticities are computed based on estimates from the random-coe￿cient logit
model. The diagonal estimates are the own elasticities and the o￿-diagonal elements are
cross elasticities. The elasticities are interpretted as the percent change in vote shares in
response to a 1% increase in corresponding campaign activity. For PAC ads, we report the
elasticity for the top 20% partisans; the overall elasticity is insigni￿cant, as PAC ads are
found to be e￿ective only on voters with strong partisan preferences.
Interpreting the elasticities for ￿eld operations deserves extra caution because a 1% increase in the
number of ￿eld o￿ces has no realistic meaning, due to the low number of ￿eld o￿ces in most counties.
Nevertheless, the estimates shed light on the relative e￿ectiveness of ground campaigning. We ￿nd that
the elasticity for ￿eld operations is higher for the Democrats than for the Republicans: the own elasticity
is estimated to be 0.037 (vs. 0.011), and the cross-elasticity is -0.006 (vs. -0.018), suggesting that the
Democrats bene￿t relatively more from ￿eld operations.
It is rather tricky to compare our ￿eld-operation elasticity estimates to those found in previous
studies, as these studies did not account for endogeneity or voter heterogeneity. For example, Darr and
Levendusky (2014) identi￿ed a 1.04% boost in county-level vote shares with the presence of a Democratic
￿eld o￿ce. By our estimates, a Democratic ￿eld o￿ce would yield a 2.4% 12 increase in vote shares,
which is larger than the Darr and Levendusky estimate but still somewhat comparable in magnitude. It
is worth noting that Darr and Levendusky (2014) used an OLS regression, which did not account for the
endogenous placements of ￿eld operations and, as we have shown, could underestimate the true e￿ect.
5.3 Counterfactual Analysis
With the structural parameter estimates, we are now ready to answer the ￿what if￿ questions: what
the election results would have been had the candidates campaigned di￿erently. These counterfactual
12An addition of one o￿ce corresponds to a 65.7% increase, given the mean of 1.52 for the Democratic ￿eld o￿ces.
29questions are crucial to understanding the true causal e￿ect of campaign activities because a causal e￿ect
is, by de￿nition, the di￿erence between factual and counterfactual inferences. For example, to pin down
the extent to which campaign activities matter to an election, we would eliminate ground campaigning
and mass-media advertising, predict the winner for each state, and then compare them to the true
electoral results. We report the various counterfactual results in Table 8.
Overall, we ￿nd that the Democrats should credit their victories to their e￿ective campaigns: had
neither party engaged in any campaign activities, the Republicans would have still won the 2004 election
but with a bigger margin, and the Democrats would have lost the next two elections. In 2008, without
campaigns, the Democrats would have lost Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, all of which,
except for Washington, were considered battleground states that year. Similarly, in 2012, with the absence
of campaigns, the Republicans would have taken a lead in eight swing states￿Colorado, Florida, Iowa,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, thus surpassing the necessary 270 electoral
votes to win the presidency.
Next, we discuss the counterfactual results when eliminating each speci￿c campaign activity while
keeping the others intact. As far as candidates’ own advertising is concerned, it seems to matter only in a
close contest, such as the 2004 election. That year, had the candidates aired no ads, the Democrats would
have won the election by a slight margin (271 vs. 267 electoral votes). In 2008 and 2012, candidates’
own advertising would not have changed the national results, although the Democrats would have had a
narrower winning margin. In particular, the Democrats would have lost Indiana to the Republicans in
2008, and Florida and Ohio in 2012, all of which were among the most heavily advertized states in each
election.
How about outside advertisements sponsored by various PACs? Not surprisingly, we ￿nd that PAC
ads played a very limited role in 2004 and 2008, considering the modest amount of PAC advertisements
in those elections. Eliminating the outside ads barely moved the needle on the election results. However,
if the 2012 election had not allowed outside ads, the Democrats would have won with a bigger margin.
The ￿nding that the Democrats bene￿ted more from banning outside ads could provide insight into the
consequences of the ￿People’s Pledge,￿ pioneered in the 2012 Massachusetts Senate race. According to
30Table 8: Counterfactuals for Zero Campaigning
2004 2008 2012
Electoral Votes Democrat Republican Democrat Republican Democrat Republican
actual 252 286 365 173 332 206
zero campaigning 182 356 216 322 262 276
zero campaign ads 271 267 358 180 300 238
zero PAC ads 253 285 353 185 383 155
zero ￿eld operations 193 345 181 357 174 364
Note: For the zero campaigning condition, we set all three campaign activities to zero for both the Democrats and the
Republicans. For zero ￿eld operations, we set the parties to have no ￿eld o￿ces but keep the other campaigning activities
intact. Vice versa for the other counterfactual conditions. The reported numbers are the total electoral votes for each party.
The winner of each election is in bold. For Alaska we used the actual results for each election.
the pledge, the Republican candidate, Scott Brown, and the Democratic candidate, Elizabeth Warren,
agreed not to accept any outside ads, aiming to curb the in￿uences of third parties. Warren defeated
Brown; thus, there has been a lot of speculation regarding the role that the pledge played in the outcome.
Our counterfactual analysis suggests that at least a part of Warren’s victory came from the banning of
PAC ads.
Our counterfactual analysis also speaks to the importance of ￿eld operations. As it turns out, there
is some truth to the popular claim that the Democrats owe their victories to their unprecedented ￿eld
operations. Had neither party set up any ￿eld o￿ces, the Republicans would have won the 2008 and
2012 elections. In particular, we ￿nd that the Democratic ￿eld operations were responsible for a large
portion of their total popular votes in 2008 and 2012. For both elections, without ￿eld operations, the
Democrats would not have won Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. In addition, they would have lost Indiana and North
Carolina in 2008 and Colorado in 2012.
If there were a chance to relive history, what would it take for the losing parties to change their fate?
In particular, could the Republicans have won the 2008 and 2012 elections had they enhanced their ￿eld
operations in swing states, as the public seemed to suggest? 13 To answer this question, we conduct a
counterfactual analysis to calculate the fewest additional ￿eld o￿ces needed for the Republicans to win
the national election. The computation is in two steps. First, for each swing state that the Republicans
13For example, days after President Obama was ￿rst elected in 2008, the Washington Times published an article claiming
that ￿one of the keys to Mr. Obama’s success was building an unprecedented ground game.￿ Four years later, the New York
times (April 17) ran an article saying that the extent to which "Mr. Romney can match the Obama’s footprint [in the
ground game] in the swing states may prove critical in deciding the election.￿
31lost, we use the model estimates to solve for the smallest number of ￿eld o￿ces needed for the Republicans
to win more popular votes in the state than the Democrats, holding constant the number and location
of the Democratic ￿eld o￿ces and other campaign activities. 14 The optimal numbers of ￿eld o￿ces are
presented in Table 9. In the second step, assuming that the cost of setting up a ￿eld o￿ce is constant
across states, we select the optimal combination of swing states that required the fewest total number of
additional ￿eld o￿ces to reach the 270 electoral votes. The optimal combination takes into account the
number of additional ￿eld o￿ces and the electoral votes that each state carries and, hence, represents
the most cost-e￿ective way to allocate ￿eld operations in order to win the election.
We ￿nd a large variation in the number of ￿eld o￿ces required for the Republicans to win each state.
For example, while it would have taken the Republicans only one additional ￿eld o￿ce to win Indiana in
the 2008 election, it would have required 21 more to win New Jersey. To reach the 270 goal that year, the
McCain campaign would have had to set up at least 19 additional o￿ces: four in Florida, one in Indiana,
three in Minnesota, two in Nevada, one in North Carolina, four in Ohio, and four in Virginia. Winning
these states would have brought in a total of 101 electoral votes. Four years later, the 2012 election would
have required fewer additional ￿eld o￿ces for the Republicans, considering that the Romney campaign
had already invested more in ￿eld operations: Romney could have won the election by utilizing nine more
￿eld o￿ces: one in Florida, two in Nevada, three in Ohio, and three in Virginia.
We then examine whether, and if so how much, more advertising could have helped the losing party
in each election. Our analysis shows that advertising could have played a critical role in deciding the
election, but only in a close competition such as the 2004 election. That year, if the Democrats had raised
their ad impressions by roughly 50% in Iowa and 80% in Ohio (corresponding to a $1.8 million and $10.6
million increase in ad spending, respectively), they would have won the two states and, with the valuable
27 electoral votes, would have taken the white house. As far as PAC ads are concerned, they could have
helped Kerry claim victory in three states by spending an additional $0.03 million (the equivalent of 50%
more GRPs) in New Mexico, $0.18 million (60% more GRPs) in Iowa, and $2.06 million (￿ve times more
14The optimization procedure, say for Colorado in 2008, goes as follows. First, we copy the value of the Democratic
￿eld operations in Colorado. Second, we solve for the number of Republican ￿eld o￿ces per county, which minimizes the
total number of ￿eld o￿ces given that the Republicans would win the majority of votes. For the 53 counties in which the
Republicans did not have an o￿ce in 2008, we restrict the value to fall between 0 and 10, as fewer than 0.5% of the counties
in our sample ever had more than ten ￿eld o￿ces. For the 11 counties with at least one o￿ce that year, we bound the
variable between the current value and 10.
32Table 9: Counterfactuals for Optimal Field O￿ces
2008 2012
State Existing Optimal State Existing Optimal
Colorado 11 18 Colorado 14 19
Florida* (27) 0 4 Florida* (29) 48 49
Indiana* (11) 0 1 Michigan 23 28
Iowa 16 25 Minnesota 0 3
Michigan 14 26 Nevada* (6) 12 14
Minnesota* (10) 13 16 New Hampshire 9 11
Nevada* (5) 12 14 Ohio* (18) 38 41
New Hampshire 4 7 Oregon 0 9
New Jersey 1 22 Pennsylvania 24 30
New Mexico 10 15 Virginia* (13) 28 30
North Carolina* (15) 18 19 Wisconsin 24 29
Ohio* (20) 9 13
Oregon 0 12
Pennsylvania 17 28
Virginia* (13) 18 22
Wisconsin 9 19
Note: We report the optimal ￿eld operations that could have helped the Republicans win each state. States
with an asterisk make up the optimal strategy that requires the fewest ￿eld o￿ces to win 270 electoral votes.
We list the electoral votes in parentheses.
GRPs) in Nevada. Had that happened, the 2004 election would have resulted in a 269 to 269 tie! As
directed by the 12th Amendment, members of the House of Representatives would have had to choose
the president that year. To break the tie, it would have cost an additional $4.1 million to win another
state (i.e., Ohio), which is probably impractical, considering that the total PAC ad spending supporting
the Democrats was merely $6.9 million that year.
However, when the winner has a big competitive advantage, it is unlikely for a losing party to change
the results solely through increasing advertising, at least not with a reasonable advertising budget. For
example, in the 2008 election, the Republicans could have won Indiana with an extra $1.9 million and
North Carolina with $1.3 million; however, they would not have been able to win another state with
even $30 million more worth of ads. Similarly, if the PACs supporting McCain had spent $12 million
more, they could have helped him win 73 more electoral votes (i.e., Florida, Indiana, North Carolina,
and Ohio); but this still could not have made up for the additional 97 electoral votes he needed to win
the election. In 2012, the Republicans could have increased their own ads to win Ohio (by $16.4 million
more spending, the equivalent of 1.3 times more GRPs) and Virginia (by $22.7 million more spending,
33the equivalent of 1.8 times more GRPs). 15 Or, the PAC ads could have helped them win Florida (with an
additional $9.8 million) and Ohio (with an additional $32.3 million, roughly a third of the total PAC ad
spending that year); but it would still be prohibitively expensive to win more states simply by increasing
advertising, whether the candidates’ own ads or outside ads.
6 Conclusion
We study the e￿ect of personal selling and mass-media advertising in the context of U.S. presidential
elections. By linking various campaign activities to county-level vote results, we o￿er a more comprehen-
sive identi￿cation of the causal e￿ect for various types of campaign activities compared to extant studies
on this topic. Furthermore, our results generate insights into the e￿ectiveness of each campaign activity
for di￿erent voter segments: ￿eld operations are more e￿ective for voters with stronger baseline partisan
preferences, while candidate advertising is more e￿ective among those with weaker partisan preferences.
With our parameter estimates, we predict counterfactual election results under several hypothetical sce-
narios. Overall, we ￿nd that political campaigns play an essential role in the outcome of elections. This is
contrary to the ￿minimum e￿ect of campaigning￿ view held by some, who claim that most voters already
have their minds made up and, hence, campaigns barely move the needle in terms of voting results. Our
results debunk this view. We show that advertising can play a critical role in a close election but not
when one party has a big advantage: had the parties not been allowed to advertise, the Democrats would
have won the 2004 election but the results would have been largely the same for the next two elections.
Had either party not implemented ￿eld operations, the Republicans would have won the 2008 and 2012
elections.
Some of the results are worth further discussion. First, the ￿nding that PAC ads behaved similarly to
ground campaigning rather than candidates’ own ads is counter-intuitive. While candidates’ own ads are
found to be more e￿ective for voters with weaker baseline partisan preferences, the opposite is true for
PAC ads. We think that this could be due to the di￿erences in ad content: PAC ads are predominately
negative and tend to attack rivals rather than promote the preferred candidates. Such a strong negative
tone perhaps works better to reinforce partisans’ beliefs than to persuade undecided voters. This seems
15In 2012, the total ad spending by the Romney campaign during the general election was roughly $109.2 million.
34consistent with Finkel and Geer (1998), who found that the weakest voter-withdrawal e￿ect for negative
ad exposures happened among individuals who were the most attentive to campaign media and who
tended to have relatively stronger partisan preferences.
Second, the ￿nding that the Democrats’ ￿eld operations are more e￿ective than the Republicans’
also deserves closer examination. The ￿eld-operation own elasticity for the Democrats is estimated to
be 2.4 times larger that that for the Republicans (Table 7). We believe that this is in part because the
Democratic candidates tended to allocate ￿eld o￿ces where they were expected to be more e￿ective￿i.e.,
among partisans. Across the three elections, the percent of registered Democrats was 34% (SD=11%) in
counties with at least one Democratic ￿eld o￿ce, in contrast to 28% (SD=8%; 2-sample t test p value <
0.01) registered Republicans where the Republican ￿eld operation was present.
Other factors, such as the quantity and quality of outreach activities, could also a￿ect the e￿ectiveness
of ￿eld operations. Quantity refers to the number of voter contacts, while quality includes the techniques
used to target and persuade voters. For example, more-personal voter interactions could be more powerful
than indirect contacts such as door hangers. This is perhaps best echoed by a quote from an Obama
￿eld director in 2012: ￿Many ￿eld campaigns have historically favored quantity over quality. We do not.
These are not phone calls made from a call center. They are done at the local level by our neighborhood
team leaders, members and volunteers, who are talking to people in their communities." 16 Despite the
potential importance, detailed data on how ￿eld teams work are challenging to obtain, especially at the
county level. We acknowledge this data limitation and believe that future research will bene￿t from
improving the measurement of ￿eld operations.
Another important direction for future research is to understand the dynamic e￿ect of campaigns. In
this paper, we aggregate advertising at the election level and, as a result, do not consider the temporal
e￿ect of campaign planning within an election. Allocating a lot of campaign e￿orts too early in the race
may risk exhausting resources that are needed for the ￿nal stretch; holding o￿ the e￿orts, on the other
hand, may mean missing the momentum to gain a head start for the voter base. Although not addressed
in this study, we believe that examining how the e￿ectiveness of di￿erent campaign activities varies over
time could be an exciting avenue for future research.
16CNN, (2012). ￿Analysis: Obama won with a better ground game.￿ Nov 7.
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